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
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**Value Changes in Hungary, 1978-1993:
Continuity and Discontinuity in the
East-Central European Transitions II**

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1. Introduction

At the Center for Value Sociology of the Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences a number of surveys have been carried out since the late 1970s in order to describe and analyse the value priorities and the structure of the value system of the country, and to map and explain its changes. The research was directed by Elemér Hankiss, the surveys were organised by Róbert Manchin and László Füstös, while the analyses were done by Hankiss, Manchin, Füstös, and Szakolczai. (1) In the surveys, a number of value tests have been used. Some were developed on the basis on in-depth interviews in Hungary - these were used mostly in the first, 1977 survey, though a child-rearing principles test that proved to be the most revealing was repeated in 1982. Others included widely used, international value sets. These were the Rokeach-test of basic human values, the Inglehart-test of materialist and post-materialist values, one child-rearing principles tests developed by Melvin Cohn, and another by the European Value System Study Group. (2) Of all these, notwithstanding the number of critical comments voiced against it, the Rokeach-test proved to be by far the most useful.

Apart from a few internal reports based mostly on the findings of the 1978 survey, for various reasons the results have not be analysed so far in depth, and were not made publicly available. (3) The aim of this paper is to present at least some preliminary findings, before an exhaustive study of the results will become possible.

2. On the concept of values

This paper will not discuss the different approaches to the study of values - a topic better suited for a whole book. Only a preliminary, working definition will be given, in order to situate the approach pursued and the questions posed.

In the conceptual framework which provides the background to this research, a value is first of all something that effectively governs the conduct of human beings: what they do (or not do), and how they act in their daily existence. There are a number of things that fit this broad description: interests, norms, customs, rules, laws, including even physical laws. (4) But of the many such possibilities, values have two additional characteristics. First, they are never reducible completely to external determining factors or causes, whether given in terms of social positions, objective interests, or cultural norms. A value is something that also puts freedom in the play; where individuals have a degree of freedom concerning the type of activity and the kind of strategy they decide to follow. In other words, values can never be imputed completely from the outside. But, second, they are accessible, through reasoning and reflection, from the inside. A value is not in impulse or an intuition that suddenly and inexplicably leads the individual to certain acts, beyond rational discourse, but the assessment, evaluation, putting into the balance one's own freedom to act by the use of one's own reasoning, of *logos*. We can only talk about actions being guided by values to the extent that they contain thought, whether an activity of thinking was explicitly connected to the given action, or that it contained a particular line of thought done before or simply assumed and taken for granted. The crucial point is that through reflection, this element of thought becomes accessible, can be spelled out; and to the extent that we are talking about values, this will be an end, a resting point of explanation. In a particular context, the individual's conduct is guided by a value if he or she had a degree of freedom to act in a certain situation, and if this freedom was effectively used by the pursuit of a certain line of action which one could defend by a reasoning based upon ultimate principles with which the individual affirms and manifests his personal identity. It is by reaching this moment of personal identification that this type of reasoned explanation arrives at a resting point beyond which it is not possible to go.

This approach to the concept of values implies two things. First, it assumes a degree of individualisation. The approach is not valid

for the description of traditional communities, where between the rules or customs guiding individual conduct and the concrete actions of individuals, there is a high degree of continuity and taken for grantedness; where individual members are not allowed to argue or reason about the way they act, or could not even conceive of such an activity. But the approach holds forcefully true for the so-called totalitarian societies. Paradoxically, one of the most oppressive characteristics of modern totalitarian regimes, that they require an explicit acknowledgement and support of the regime by the individuals themselves, has as a latent and lasting effect the promotion of the idea that a certain state of affairs has to be defended or justified, therefore increases the emphasis on reasoning, and thus contributes to its own demise. But this point also holds true for the other way as well. Individuals may well decide to tell lies when asked about their values, or the reasons for their conduct. But the very act of giving reasons has an impact on the exact relationship between the individual and the values he/ she is using in guiding conduct; leaves a mark on his identity, being. In this framework, by its uttering, by the retroactive effect it has on the speaking subject, a lie becomes a reality, and therefore will have a certain element of truth. The approach according to which opinion polls on values are unreliable in a not democratic situation as they do not reveal the true preferences is simplistic. Basic human values are not matters of opinions that may change every day. It cannot be assumed that two persons could have identical values, only their willingness to express is different. Such a willingness or modality of expression is an internal part of one's value system itself.

Second, the idea according to which values define the way individuals assess the stakes and make use of their freedom does not mean that the full weight of freedom and reflection (thinking) is actually made use of continuously. In one's daily life, it is very rare that an action actually involves explicit thinking about alternatives, or the expression of concrete values. These do happen in certain moments, but then the results of such moments become taken for granted. Values, therefore, have a dual character. On the one hand, they are the potential sources of

innovation, imagination, and change; they are the most active, mobile elements of human conduct, as opposed to the static and mechanical concept of interests, and the deterministic concepts of impulses, urges, instincts. On the other, they are covered by vast layers of habits, taken for granted, routine activities and forms of behaviour, therefore also provide stability and continuity, a high degree of resistibility to change.

Values, therefore, are a particularly suitable topic for the study of major socio-political transformations. Such events not only provide opportunities, but in a sense make it imperative for individuals of stepping back from the way they lived so far, of reflecting on their own activities, and of using their reason in order to adjust their behaviour and to reorganise the system of values that ultimately govern their conduct. The extent to which such a reorganisation does in fact takes place is a fundamental question in order to study a crucial point in all transitions: the combination of continuity and discontinuity. Apart from simply describing the changes, a study of the actual change of value priorities or the structure of the value system can also help us to evaluate the changes, and to diagnose possible reasons for the failure of taking up certain opportunities. Understood in this sense, changes in value preferences are not simply pale mirrors of the "actual, real" processes going on in society, but have an irreducible, and even fundamental role in fuelling, accelerating, and slowing down; of guiding or perhaps misleading the changes.

(5)

3. Data and hypotheses

In this paper only the results of the Rokeach-test will be analysed. This test for the study of basic human values was developed by the American social psychologist Milton Rokeach. (6) Through a long series of experiments, Rokeach developed a set of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values which according to him reproduce the most important value orientations, spanning the whole space of possible values. The terminal values define basic

life goals or desirable end-states, while the instrumental values the means that can be ordered to the attainment of these goals. Individuals are asked to rank, separately, the 18 terminal and instrumental values. The full set is contained in the Appendix.

Data are available for four national representative surveys that all administered the Rokeach test in 1978, 1982, 1990, and 1993. (7) All four observation points are from highly relevant periods. The first captures the system at a moment in time when most of the mechanisms that were functioning for decades were to a large extent still intact. This was the moment when the reforms progressed to the point that the administration of a national representative survey containing such questions was possible (it was officially permitted, and one could expect reasonable responses), but when the structure of the value system still could reflect the full impact of the system. By 1982, the erosion of the former system started in a much larger scale. The offensive against the reforms came to a halt, and new economic measures were introduced that made the changes ever more clearly irreversible. In fact, a third observation around the middle of the 1980s would have been very useful to assess the scope of changes, but for various reasons, no survey was done at that point. Instead, we have results for the Autumn of 1990, just in the year of political changes; and finally for September 1993, which is the present, and includes the experience of the first post-communist years.

The paper will not test operational hypotheses about changes in value preferences and structures. The possibility of modelling will be explored later, when value changes will be linked to sociological background variables. For the moment, the aim is only to describe and interpret the shift in the values themselves.

The analysis will be guided by four broad questions. The first concerns the degree of smoothness in the changes throughout the 15-year time-period. It is a commonplace that in Hungary, the shift from the old regime to the new happened without major dislocations. The question is the extent to which this general view

is confirmed by the data on values, and what are the kind of values that did change in such a gradual way. Second, one may wonder whether the opposite scenario would not hold true for certain values; whether some trends started in the old regime persist even under new conditions. Third, apart from these issues of continuity, particular emphasis will be laid on searching for the values for whom 1990 represented a clear break. The question is whether this break is restricted mostly to the formal, ideological aspects of the former regime, or whether we could establish other clear breaks concerning the way people conduct themselves and perceive the others. Finally, fourth, the question is whether in between 1990 and 1993, we can document the start of any significant new trends; or whether apart from the questions of continuity and stability in trends, preferences, and structures, there are even certain returns to former ways of acting and thinking.

The concrete analysis will focus on two issues. First, it will assess the changes in the value priorities in Hungary between 1978 and 1993. This will be done by a simple analysis of changes in means, using t-tests. (8) Second, with the help of factor analysis, it will assess whether there were major dislocations in the structure of value preferences during the given time period.

4. Changes in value preferences

Figures 1 and 2 show the average selection of the 18 terminal and instrumental values, respectively, for the four time periods. What first meets the eye is the high degree of stability in value preferences throughout the whole time period. In spite of the fact that changes are visible, the overall impression is much more one of stability. This confirms two things at the same time: the validity of the measuring instruments, and also the expectation that the systemic change did not lead to a major, overall reorganisation of the structure of value preferences in Hungary.

Both points are further confirmed by the high degree of stability of a number of individual values (see Table 2, and also Figures 1 and 2). In one-third of all the values, there were no significant changes during the 15 years span; in most cases, not change at all between any of the four survey years. (9) These eleven values can be divided into four blocks, of which three is highly homogenous: ethical values (COURAGEOUS, RESPONSIBLE, HONEST); hedonistic values (EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE, CHEERFUL, FRIENDSHIP); religious values (SALVATION, FORGIVING); and finally a rather mixed group of autonomy values (FREEDOM, CAPABLE). There is nothing surprising in the stability of the first two groups that simply reproduce the basic framework of the value system in any industrial society: the high and stable importance of values defining moral conduct, and the low priority assigned to the sheer enjoyment of life. The second half of the results is less obvious. First, it is quite surprising that the two most explicitly religious values did not go up in importance between 1978 and 1993. SALVATION remained the rock-bottom value for the Hungarian population. This is a significant finding even if this is more a Protestant than a catholic value, and even if in Hungarian, it can be confused with salutation if one is careless. (10) The case of FORGIVING is even stranger, because this value, already marginal in Hungary compared to other countries, was still steadily losing importance, even if the losses were smaller. (11) Finally, it is also not evident that the autonomy values that were relatively unimportant in Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s should remain so in the 1990s.

Another pattern is given by values manifesting a steady, continuous change. In one sense, it is the opposite of stability; but, in other sense, this also shows a certain continuity between the two systems: continuity in the sense of gradual change, as opposed to a radical break, a discontinuity. First, there was a steady, significant increase in the importance of four values: WISDOM, IMAGINATIVE, INTELLECTUAL, and LOGICAL. The four together clearly define a process of intellectualisation. Concerning the first, the relative increase in importance occurred against a very low initial value. But concerning the other three values, the situation

was different. Already in our 1983 study, one of the major finding was that compared to the United States, Hungarian society showed a high degree of individualisation and intellectualisation. (12) There, it was connected to the special kind of socialist modernisation, the high emphasis put on formal education and the role of intellectuals that was characteristic of the formal system. It would have been reasonable to expect that after the changes, this trend had been reversed. In fact, the exact opposite happened. Such a purely mental property as LOGICAL went up nine places in the rank order of 18 by 1993, passing over such values as INDEPENDENT, CHEERFUL, LOVING, or POLITE; while INTELLECTUAL, being one of the lasts in the American value system in 1968, by 1993 became the most important instrumental value for Hungarians, ahead even of the moral-ethical values. We should also emphasise that though the changes for these four values were monotonous between the four years, the greatest upsurge happened after the changes, between 1990 and 1993.

This shift of importance in certain values was counterbalanced by a steady decline in others. These could be divided in two groups. The first gives the reverse side of intellectualisation: a decrease in values related to interpersonal relations, sociability, or communal life. This concerns partly FORGIVING, where the changes were small between the neighbouring years, but became almost significant by 1993; and especially HELPFUL, that in the late 1970s was the only value related to human interaction still as highly appreciated in Hungary as in the US. By 1993, even this has been altered, HELPFUL being the only instrumental value that significantly lost importance from year to year.

There was another set of values that also steadily lost importance, and where the systemic change represented an acceleration: these are WORK, SELF-RESPECT, and to some extent SOCIAL RECOGNITION (here, the major break is between 1982 and 1990). Both the semantics of the terms and our earlier studies confirm that this is a relatively homogenous group, related to a special socialist type of value system, oriented more to traditional social-democratic values than to the official communist ideology.

With the last, SOCIAL RECOGNITION, we can turn to those values that seem to be the most revealing for our special purpose: where the crucial change happened definitely, and in a discontinuous manner, with the systemic change. However, there are not many such cases. Apart from SOCIAL RECOGNITION, where even before the changes, there was a significant loss of importance, there were only two whose importance dropped radically and for good in 1990. These are EQUALITY and OBEDIENT; values who had very strong link not only to socialist or official communist ideology, but also to its everyday practice. Correspondingly, there were two values whose importance went up: WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS.

These results concerning the link between value change and systemic change are meager and trivial: the importance of values that were most exposed in the old system and closest to its everyday practice went down, while the values connected to material well-being, due to the increased insecurity and the economic problems went up. But there is another type of change linked more peculiarly to the year of the transition; a set of values in the assessment of which there is a definite shift in 1990, but where by 1993, the change disappears, and the importance of the value returns to the earlier level; values for which 1990 was more of a disturbance than a radical change.

First, there are two values whose importance decreased very significantly between 1982 and 1990, but that, by 1993, not only regained their earlier levels, but even advanced beyond it: these are PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY. These values had a specific meaning in the Hungarian context. In the former system, these were the most important terminal values of the population at large; values whose importance largely overpasses that in the United States; values that can easily be associated with the official socialist value system, its closed and paranoid character. The connection between the official value system and these values was also confirmed by empirical evidence. For those who were Communist party members, especially those who also completed some special party education, these values were even much more

important than for the population at large. (13) Therefore, these were the actual, official ideological values of existing socialism, and not the social democratic values of work, recognition by other, and self-respect.

With the collapse of the system, the importance of this ideology considerably diminished, but by 1993, the trend was reversed. The data clearly show a new kind of ideological mobilisation, but this time dissociated from the classical socialist one, as the values that were specifically socialist in theory or practice (EQUALITY, WORK, OBEDIENT) did not gain additional importance. Such an interpretation is confirmed by a value that lies in between the two different shifts, SOCIAL RECOGNITION. This value, like the other social democratic values, clearly lost importance throughout the last 15 years; but, after the changes, there are signs of a certain reversal of the trends - as if it were increasingly detaching itself from the social democratic-socialist value system, and reconnect itself more with the values that are "ideological" perhaps as a matter of deeper mentality, and not connected to any single partisan belief.

The peculiar shifts in the ideological values also have their exact counterpart in the movement of three other values: FAMILY SECURITY, INNER HARMONY, and LOVE. These values form the semantic opposite of the official socialist-ideological values, and were the values most associated with the non-party member parts of the population, especially intellectuals. The fact that their importance went up after the changes is therefore not surprising. But that only a few years later, they practically resumed their earlier level, is more difficult to explain, and may also be more disconcerting.

The rest of the values followed courses that are more difficult to interpret without further, structural analysis. There were a set of values where 1982 represented an unsustained change. Thus, the importance of SELF-CONTROLLED, CLEAN, and POLITE went up, that of LOVING went down in 1982, but by 1993, they resumed their earlier level. For two others, the break-point was also 1982,

but with no return; these are AMBITIOUS and INDEPENDENT. Contrary to all expectations, from the 1980s, with the onset of the new wave of reforms, these are exactly the pragmatic, action- and well-being oriented instrumental values that are losing their importance. Finally, one value, BROADMINDED had a unique and puzzling trajectory. Its average rank went up significantly from 1978 to 1982, but suffered a very serious loss between 1982 and 1990, and finally, by 1990, resumed its original, 1978 level.

5. Changes in the structure of the value system

So far, only changes in the relative importance of individual values were analysed, though attention was being paid to the way different values were moving together, and in the interpretation of such moves, we made implicit use of the results of earlier work. The aim now is to study directly changes in the structure of the value system. Such a study is to be pursued on three different levels. At the first, it must reflect a basic continuity, as the structure of the value system of a whole society cannot change completely overnight, even with a change of the socio-political system. At the second, it must show some patterns of change that are easily intelligible, and reflect the obvious change happening in Hungary in the last 15 years. It is only at the third level that the empirical concrete results could be of value, once they are confirmed by the first two steps; when they give us some precise information about the timing, direction and strength of the expected changes; and perhaps could even offer us new information that could not have been obtained by other means.

The method used was factor analysis. (14) The data showed the existence of five common factors for 1978, six for 1982, and seven for 1990 and 1993 respectively. (15) These factors together explained around 22% of the total variance in each year which, considering the kind of "very soft" data we very dealing with is a good solution. (16).

The original, unrotated factors indicate the most important dividing lines concerning value choices in the population, as measured by the amount of variance explained. This gives important information as far as the first few such divisions are concerned. However, after the first few factors, the relative differences in explained variances being minor anyway, the interpretation of the actual factors is much helped by rotation. With the help of this procedure, we can get a clearer view of the most important systematic contrasts characteristic of the whole structure of the variables, as rotation defines each individual factor simultaneously, on the basis of all the information contained in the preserved factor structure, and eliminates the arbitrariness of the recursive method used for the specification of the original factors. Therefore, only the first three unrotated factors will be interpreted, and a more detailed analysis will be made of all rotated factors after.

5.1. The unrotated factors

The first factor defines the most important cleavage concerning the choice of values for the population at large, and separates therefore the two most distinct groups of values (see table 3). The results show again a combination of fundamental continuity, and a very strong and definite change. In all four years, the factor defines an opposition between intellectual instrumental values on the one hand, and values related to interpersonal relations on the other. But there is a basic difference: the ideological values are strongly present, together with the intellectuals values, on one pole of the factor in 1978; their presence becomes considerably weaker by 1982, and in the 1990s, they practically leave the factor. Though, even here, there are indications of a swing: in 1990, most of the ideological values (PEACE, EQUALITY, NATIONAL SECURITY) almost appear in the opposite pole of the factor; while in 1993, they are again on the same pole with the intellectual values, although with negligible factor loading.

Among the intellectual values, there is also a definite internal reorganisation. While in 1978, the factor contained together values that were more strictly related to mental capacities, and of ethical and pragmatic characteristics, the importance of these latter definitely declined in the factor in later years.

The changes in the relationship between the (terminal) ideological and (instrumental) intellectual values are mirrored in the other pole of the factor. In 1978 and to a smaller extent in 1982, this pole contains a combination of instrumental values that are more traditional, related to interpersonal relations and community life, and a set of terminal values concerned with a comfortable and easy life. The latter set drops out of the factor in the 1990s. The first set is stable, with minor oscillations.

First, the two values that define most steadily this factor pole throughout the years are FORGIVING and LOVING; values where the emphasis is much less on external, traditional or disciplinary constraints on behaviour, but on interpersonal relations; on making such relations more relaxed and rewarding. The opposition, therefore, that characterises most the polarisation, the division, the divergence among the value choices of Hungarians in this relatively long, 15-year time period, is the contrast of IMAGINATIVE and LOGICAL vs. FORGIVING and LOVING. Second, another compact set of values steadily present in the factor are POLITE, CLEAN, and OBEDIENT; values that can be best termed disciplinary, related to the external controls imprinted and enforced in the population at large by the spread of courtly techniques of behaviour with the long civilising process. (17) Third, two values become more present in the factor after the changes. One is SALVATION, where the difference is small; the other HELPFUL, where this is a decisive break, as this value was not significantly present in the first unrotated factor before. Therefore, helpfulness as a value not only lost its relative importance, but also became a much more partisan value, associated with a factor that in general contains values much more preferred by the lower strata. In the span of fifteen years, from one of the widely accepted cornerstones of the value system,

helpfulness became marginalised in Hungary as a specific choice of those people who had a more traditional outlook. (18)

The second unrotated factor gives the second greatest divide among the choice of values, independently, in the sense of a zero correlation, from the previous factor (see Table 4). This factor also shows a basic coherence through the years, with a change that mirrors the one that happened with the first factor. In 1978, at one pole, we find a combination of the ideological and the traditional disciplinary values. The latter set of values, however, steadily retreat from the factor, and by the 1990s, disappear altogether. In all four periods, the core of the factor consists of PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, the most exposed ideological values of the former system (as given in the Rokeach set); but the other two ideological values, EQUALITY and FREEDOM are also in, as there is a minor, but stable presence of SOCIAL RECOGNITION.

The other pole of the second unrotated factor completes the picture, showing the manner in which the two mixed ends-and-means factors of the Communist period separated into a purely ends and a purely means factor. In 1978, this pole was composed of intellectual and hedonistic values. The intellectual values, however, have already disappeared from this pole by 1982. Within the hedonistic values, there were two subsets. The first consists of values that are hedonistic in a narrow sense, related to the sheer, active enjoyment of life (EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE, CHEERFUL, and to some extent HAPPINESS). The other set is also related to the enjoyment of life, but refers to close interpersonal relations (LOVE, FRIENDSHIP). In this unrotated factor, both sets were present together, with HAPPINESS acting as a bridge between the two subsets.

The third unrotated factor defines the third major division in the population, uncorrelated with the first and second major divisions between intellectual and traditional-interpersonal instrumental values, and between ideological and hedonistic values (see Table 5). This is an opposition between the inside, personality characteristics with some religious overtones, and the outside,

materialism. One pole consists of BEAUTY, WISDOM, and SALVATION. In the 1990s, joined to this pole are INNER HARMONY, and to some extent SELF-RESPECT. Together with another shift within this factor, it defines a marked change in profile. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the core value of the factor is BEAUTY, indicating the rather aesthetic character of the pole; while by the 1990s, there is a shift of meaning toward the other values already contained in the factor, WISDOM and SALVATION. The shift, therefore, is from mere aestheticism to the more complex issue of personality formation, a concern with the forming of oneself. This is connected but not reduced to religiosity.

The core of other pole is a straightforward materialism, as shown by the continuous presence of the values of PLEASURE and especially WELL-BEING. But even here, there is a marked displacement. In the old regime, materialism, the emphasis on a pleasant life was joined with an instrumental value on the one hand (AMBITIOUS); and two terminal values (FAMILY and HAPPINESS). The first link shows a means-ends connection: in order to gain well-being, one has to be ambitious. By some reason, this link, very strong in 1978, has vanished in the 1980s, and is only slowly gaining importance by the 1990s. The second subordinates material well-being as a terminal value to a more basic goal, by connecting it to the strong, compact value-set of FAMILY and HAPPINESS, giving a reason for the need to be ambitious and strive for material well-being. This is also detached from material well-being in the 1990s in Hungary. The two together defines a peculiar swing: at the moment when the pursuit of material goods and well-being become self-contained, "auto finalised", an end in itself, not necessarily related to the joint well-being of a small community, the family, it also loses its instrumental support. It becomes an end in itself, but left without acceptable means to support it.

This is an important finding, both for substantive and methodological reasons. The analysis of changes in the means showed us that AMBITIOUS was one of the few values for which 1982 represented a sustained loss of importance. All this indicates

that whenever a particular value becomes more or less important on the average, it may entail that it also becomes more or less strongly related (correlated) with the other values, thus gains or loses force in defining the shape of the whole value system. (19)

There is only one final point to add here. In 1990, the two most exposed ideological values, PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY also enter the pole, joining WELL-BEING, though their influence becomes negligible by 1993. Considering the fact that in 1978 and 1982, they were on the opposite pole of the first unrotated factor, this reflects a very huge swing, indicating either (or both) that the earlier ideological elite has a strong role in the definition of the new, "independent" materialist factor; or that it is among the non-elite supporters of the former regime that material considerations, the loss of previous levels of comfort and security became the most acute.

5.2. The rotated factors

The unrotated factors defined the major cleavages within the social value system, in order of relative importance, as measured by the percentage of variance explained. With the study of the rotated factors, we can get a glimpse of a more compact set of dichotomies dividing the society; a finer analysis of the different subsets of values that are present in the society, using information that were contained in the other factors, but that can be made accessible only after rotation.

The first rotated factor is close to the first unrotated, defining an opposition between the intellectual and interpersonal instrumental values for all years (see Table 6). The core of the intellectual values are the same: IMAGINATIVE, LOGICAL, INTELLECTUAL, and CAPABLE. But two subsets that were present in the factor in the old regime, as indicated by their definite presence in 1978, leave the factor. One is the ethical values of COURAGEOUS and RESPONSIBLE, known to be close to (providing the link to) the ideological values. The other are INDEPENDENT and

BROADMINDED. The explanation of the second can only be given by taking all factors together. Concerning the first, we find the same movement as in the case of AMBITIOUS: a strongly pragmatic value that leaves its factor and drops average importance just when the former system is losing its grip, and when one could expect a definite increase in its importance and factor-generating power. It should have become a leading value of the factor, and the exact opposite was happening throughout the 1980s. Finally, just as in the case of the role of AMBITIOUS in the third unrotated factor, here also we find some regaining of strength by 1993.

The opposite pole contains the core instrumental values of the first unrotated factor, repeating the inclusion of HELPFUL in the 1990s. The only difference is that in this period, CLEAN and POLITE leave the factor, in order to form a new one.

The first rotated factor, in spite of some internal shifts, was the same in all three years. In the second one, there are major changes (see Table 7). One of the poles stays the same throughout: this is the pole of ideological factors (PEACE, EQUALITY, NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM). The only small change is that the factor becomes "purer" already by the 1980s, and stays so: the values of SOCIAL RECOGNITION and SELF-CONTROL, slightly present in 1978, leave it completely. At the other pole, however, there is a complete turnover. In the old regime, the opposition to ideology was provided by a specific and heterogenous set of values: FAMILY, HAPPINESS, WELL-BEING, INNER HARMONY, LOVE and LOVING. This factor could be described as FAMILY being at the centre, providing a link on the other hand to WELL-BEING and HAPPINESS, on the other hand, toward the personality values. Semantically, this set of values combines the well-known alternative strategies to the ideology and reality of the old regime: a turn toward family, close personal relations and inner composure against the pressures of the system. This semantic reading was supported by social background findings. The values that proved to be very important for those university graduates who were not party members, while relatively neglected by

former party school graduates were exactly INNER HARMONY, WORK, FAMILY, and LOVING. (20)

If this was a coherent "silent opposition" strategy employed in the old regime, its importance has become already weaker by the 1980s, and completely disappeared in the 1990s. At the opposite pole of the ideological values, we find the a different set in the 1990s: the complete set of hedonistic values. The core of the pole consists of the narrowly hedonistic values, oriented toward pure excitation and sensory pleasure (EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE), but also present are the values of interpersonal relations, LOVE and FRIENDSHIP.

This is the new opposite pole of the ideological values as contained in the second factor in 1990 and 1993; but this is not a newly emerging value subsystem. Almost the same group of values (the strictly hedonistic values of EXCITING LIFE, PLEASURE, CHEERFUL) were also present together in 1978 and 1982 as one pole of the third unrotated factor (see Table 8). The other pole of that third factor was defined mostly by ideological values: PEACE, NATIONAL SECURITY, and an ethical value closely associated with them, RESPONSIBLE.

The link between hard-core ideology and ethics may seem difficult to understand. We have already seen a link between ideological and ethical values in the first unrotated factors, but there, on the one hand, it was a link to intellectual values, on the other, the whole set of ideological values were present, including the more idealistic values of FREEDOM and EQUALITY. This peculiar third factor can be understood by bringing in the two other values also present in the factor in 1978 but already dropping out by 1982: FAMILY and HONEST. (21)

This factor can be rendered intelligible if it is conceptualised again as a double-edged factor, with a bridge point. This is ethics, bridging ideology and the family. In the old system, on the one hand, there was a strong, ideological and moral emphasis on strong, uncompromising ethical values at the level of official

ideology that explains its semantic closeness with ethics. On the other hand, such ethical values also have strong ties to the family. Finally, what this factor reflects is that in a certain way, the ethical commitment to family, to the provision of a proper existence for family members also implied that it was necessary to accept, to put up with a degree of ideology, to accommodate oneself in a certain way with the system. People with a family, especially those with a strong ethical commitment to their family were more easily susceptible either to be blackmailed with ideology, or to accept and internalise it.

This factor may have played an important role for long decades. It certainly had a distinct presence in 1978. But even by 1982, a split emerged. After the systemic change this pole of the factor, that was the paradoxical, lower-class equivalent of the family-centred dissident-intellectual strategy contained in the second factor also disappeared, and the collapse of both made it possible for the two other halves of the second and third rotated factors remaining "idle" (ideology and sheer hedonism) to reunite as the opposite poles of a single factor.

Two of the factors featuring in the structure of the Hungarian value system before the systemic change were joined therefore into one; the factors that duplicated in a certain way the division according to ideology. This movement, however, as if in a fugue, had its counterpoint. In the 1990s, instead of the duplication of the first terminal factor, due to the preponderant influence of ideological considerations, we have a duplication of the first instrumental factor - due to the newly dominant role of the intellectual values (see Table 9). On one pole of the third rotated factor in the 1990s, we find intellectual values: especially IMAGINATIVE and BROADMINDED, but also CAPABLE, LOGICAL, and RESPONSIBLE; while on the other side, CLEAN and POLITE, and in 1990 also LOVING and CHEERFUL. Intellectual values took over the earlier role of ideology: they are able to form in the value system two major, slightly different pairs of opposed strategies.

But it is not simply the intellectual values that feature on one pole of the factor, but especially high factor loading is assigned to, apart from IMAGINATIVE, the value that at the same time left the first factor: BROADMINDED. Therefore, apart from the duplication of the intellectual factor, there is also a split. The fact that the partial duplication of the ideological factor in 1978 and 1982 did not lead to the vanishing of any of the ideological values in the full factor shows that this did not have to happen for methodological reasons. This adds to the already perceived peculiarities in the movements of BROADMINDED.

The fourth rotated factor proved to be very stable through the fifteen years (see Table 10). On one pole, we find material WELL-BEING as the overwhelming, dominant value defining the factor. Together with it, there are PLEASURE and HAPPINESS, values that are consistently selected together with well-being. With these terminal values, there are two instrumental values that are joined in different times, AMBITIOUS and OBEDIENT. The first is present until the last year, while the second only appears in the 1980s, to disappear in 1990 and reappear in 1993. Together, this indicates a strange shift: material well-being in the old regime, up to the 1980s, was not connected to obedience, rather to being ambitious; but, somehow, relative weights shifted, and while the first connection was severed, the second was reconfirmed. This led to the paradoxical situation that the instrumental value most connected to WELL-BEING in Hungary in the 1980s and 1990s was not pragmatism, independence or ambition, but obedience; and this happened at the same time when the importance of WELL-BEING went drastically up, while that of OBEDIENCE went decisively down. With this respect, 1990 again represented a temporary break on the trend. In the year of hope, WELL-BEING became reconnected to AMBITIOUS, and to nothing else; but by 1993, the general trend of the 1980s became reasserted.

At the opposite end of materialism, one would expect to find a certain type of idealism. In fact, this is the case. The idealism reflected on this pole, however, is different from the idealism of ideology. The core values are INNER HARMONY, LOVE, and

especially BEAUTY in all four years. To these can be added the strong presence of BROADMINDED in the old regime. This, however, more or less disappears again from the factor by 1993.

The fifth rotated factor contains on one of its poles a homogenous set of values in all four years: the social democratic values of SOCIAL RECOGNITION, WORK, and SELF-RESPECT (see Table 11). There is no change in the composition of this value system. In spite of its declining importance, it kept its presence. The only small internal shift to mention concerns the very strong presence of SELF-RESPECT in 1990, and its much smaller factor loading either in the 1980s, or by today. On the opposite pole, there is a major reorganisation - surprisingly at the turn of the 1980s, and not the 1990s. In 1978, the social democratic values are opposed, in a remarkable manner, to the official socialist values of NATIONAL SECURITY and especially PEACE. This finding has relevance for several reasons. First, because it marks, even in 1978, a still present distinction between the official communist ideology and the pragmatic socialist-social democratic values within the population. Second, at a general level, it shows that in three of the five major factors dividing the value choices of the Hungarian population in 1978, the two official-ideological socialist values define one of the poles, indicating the overwhelming presence of this ideology in the structuration of the value system, whether pro or contra. Finally, this opposition disappears already by the 1980s: the ideological values retreat from this factor, cease to be the counterpart of the ideas of social democracy.

Their place is taken by a rather loose set of values, dominated by HAPPINESS, serving again as a bridge between two different groups: WELL-BEING and PLEASURE on the one hand, and LOVE and LOVING on the other. It indicates that the social democratic system of values preserved its oppositional, stoic character even in the 1980s and 1990; but it was not longer critical towards the - collapsing - socialist ideology, but rather to a perceived combination of materialism and hedonism. In this context, it is relevant to note again a slight internal shift: LOVE left this pole in 1990, just at the moment of changes, when life seemed a little

more hopeful, and it was not an issue that provoked much antagonism. By 1993, it returned to the factor, and with a very strong presence.

So far, the changes in the five factors already present in 1978 were analysed. In 1982, there was an additional sixth factor in the data (see Table 12). It was not, however, completely unrelated to the 1978 results, but was created by a combination of the strengthening of the personality and religious values found in third unrotated factor, and the separation between ideology and family morality. On one pole of this new factor, there are WISDOM and SALVATION as the core values, and also BEAUTY, FORGIVING, and OBEDIENT; on the other, FAMILY and RESPONSIBLE. By the 1980s, the latter two values got increasingly separated from ideology, and also took part in a quite different value-strategic game. (22) The stake was no longer one of responsibility and a necessary (forced) allegiance with the system, or simple irresponsibility and hedonism, but rather the choice between two, equally "respectful" or "responsible" strategies: find composure in living for others, in a family, or in finding comfort and stability in the development of one's own personality, in a strongly religious-Christian context. Apart from the merely negative change of the loss of ideology, this also indicates a more positive development.

The opening of a sixth factor represents an important novelty in the structure of the Hungarian value system, a good sign on several accounts, indicating the loss of the hold of ideology, an increasing pluralism, and the formulation of clearer and more distinct alternative strategies. The only perplexity concerns the reason why these latter had to be opposed to each other; why was it that a concern with responsibility towards one's family should be opposed by another strategy, emphasising religiosity and beauty. Though the ipsativity of the Rokeach test makes it obligatory that preference given to one set of values must be accompanied with a relative rejection of others, it is not certain that all factors must have a negative pole (the necessary negative factor loading could well be divided, in theory, evenly and thinly among a large number of values); and it is certainly not evident

that the two strategies defined in the opposite poles of the sixth factor in 1982 are in fact contradictory or exclusive of each other. In fact, by 1990, the two poles of this factor separated into a distinct sixth and seventh factor; and this separation was steadily maintained in 1993. And the fact that the meaning of these poles was not at all opposite is shown by the way they separated. On the one hand, each pole incorporated the same value: INNER HARMONY; on the other, none of them gained a distinct opposite pole.

The sixth rotated factor in the 1990s, then, has on one of its side WISDOM, SALVATION, INNER HARMONY, and BEAUTY. The first two has a strong and stable presence throughout, while the importance of the third is increasing and of the last is decreasing. We encounter the same phenomenon here as in the third unrotated factor: a shift within the inner-directed, personality oriented factor from aestheticism to inner composure. As a final comment, it is somewhat surprising to find that in this pole that contains SALVATION with such a steady and high loading, and in a context that makes it obvious that no possible confusion with salutation could have happened here, none of the instrumental values that have religious connotations (FORGIVING, HELPFUL, LOVING) were present. Surprisingly, the loss of connection between ends and means that characterised the value system of Hungary in the 1990s became also prevalent for the religious value system.

The other pole of the factor is quite weak and difficult to join into a coherent sub-system; yet, it contains a stable block of values both in 1990 and 1993: SOCIAL RECOGNITION, PLEASURE, and FREEDOM. The following explanation can be proposed. With the collapse of official atheism and materialism, there remained no coherent system of values that could be opposed to this inside-oriented value system; only those who share these values have a particular resistance or resentment against those values that merely touch the surface but has no depth, no substance in them - whether these external rewards are related to society, ideology, or the enjoyment of life.

The internal structure of the seventh factor is similar (see Table 13). At one pole, we have the second pole of the sixth factor in 1982 repeated, and in a form that represents an even clearer analogy with the third factor in 1978: FAMILY, HONEST, and RESPONSIBLE; with the only difference that INNER HARMONY is added even to this factor. With this, a peculiar reorganisation of the value system has been accomplished, a distortion of the communist regime was eliminated. In the old regime, the importance of family had a dual aspect. On the one hand, it was a crucial locus, together with other values related to inner composure and emotions, of opposition to the official ideological value system. On the other, the need to support a family also required the making of compromises, and of a certain adjustment to, or living together with the system, leading to support being given to official ideology. The pressure of the system for doing so already diminished by the 1980s, but by then, FAMILY and RESPONSIBILITY still were opposed to an inner-directed, personalist-oriented strategy. In the new order, by the breakdown of not only the official ideology but also the opposite strategy, FAMILY loses its double-edged character, and a single factor takes up both the ethical instrumental values of family support, and the inner value of composure.

The other pole of this factor is even weaker than in the sixth, but still persistent, combining PLEASURE, FREEDOM, and IMAGINATIVE. The same comments can therefore be repeated: this is not a positive value system, only a joint rejection of certain values. There is a considerable overlap with the previous second pole, but with a slight shift in meaning. The emphasis is not simply on exteriority, but on activity and autonomy, a type of action based on momentary as opposed to long-term considerations; a strategy opposed to family responsibility.

The analysis so far centred upon the large-scale shifts in the selection and structure of all the values taken together, or a considerable number of them. As a final word, let us include something different: the in-depth assessment of the behaviour of two single values, INNER HARMONY and BROADMINDED. These have both theoretical and empirical interest. Theoretically, each represents single-handedly a crucial dimension of the value-system: the relation to oneself, and the relation to others. BROADMINDED (OPEN-MINDED) represents in clear form the generalised relation to others; the presence or absence of an open, tolerant attitude toward other human beings. (23) INNER HARMONY is the only value in the set that defines a purely internal relation of the individual to himself or herself as a person; not linked to any external, social, intellectual, interpersonal, ideological, aesthetic or ethical ends or states. Empirically, these are the two values that produce the most varied and strange moves throughout the years, concerning both their average selections, and their roles in the factor structure. This indicates that throughout the period, there were crucial shifts in Hungary concerning both the relations to self, and to others.

Summarising the findings first for BROADMINDED, it gained some importance from 1978 to 1982, lost a great deal by 1990, and in 1993, just regained the importance it had originally. The most surprising finding is the huge loss just when the systemic change occurred. The only other instrumental values that had a similar trajectory were OBEDIENT and SELF-CONTROLLED; values that semantically and empirically had strong connections with the official-socialist ideology, and who went up in the 1980s and down in the 1990s together with the ideological values. It seems therefore that the idea to be open and tolerant toward the others was conceived by a considerable proportion of the population as a disciplinary constraint, as part of the official ideology, that is to be forgotten by the end of communism.

But in the factor structures, BROADMINDED was never together in the same factor with either the ideological or the disciplinary values. In 1978, it was firmly located within the intellectual-

pragmatic values, both in the first unrotated and rotated factors; and was also present in the third unrotated and the fourth rotated factors, indicating a strong link to aestheticism and personal relations, as opposed to materialism. The first role is unbroken even in 1982, but concerning the second, there is a peculiarity: it disappears from the third unrotated factor. In 1990, there is a major and sustained change: BROADMINDED falls completely out of the major intellectual factors, and forms, mostly together with IMAGINATIVE, a new factor on its own, opposed to those values that define an external, traditional control over behaviour: CLEAN and POLITE (but not OBEDIENT). The reason may be that with the continuation of intellectualisation, and its opposition to the values of interpersonal relations, those values that had a slightly different meaning, related less to sheer mental capacity and more openness were separated, at least partly, from the general intellectual factor, and were opposed only to those values from the opposite pole that emphasised not interpersonal relations, but the external control of behaviour. As a final change, by 1993, BROADMINDED even dropped of from the fourth factor, indicating a severing of ties with BEAUTY.

Changes in the average ranking of INNER HARMONY were just the opposite as those of BROADMINDED. Its average value stayed constant in the old regime, increased considerably by 1990, only to fall back to the original level by 1993. In the factor structures, INNER HARMONY appeared in two places in 1978: as part of the "opposite intellectual" strategy opposed to the ideological values in the second rotated factors, and as part of the aesthetic-personality side of the fourth factor together with BROADMINDED. By 1990, as we have seen, this pole of the second factor disappears, and the value also loses importance in the fourth factor. Instead, this value almost single-handedly contributes now to the formation of both the sixth and the seventh factors, separating into different factors the two poles of the sixth factor in 1982.

All this follows a consistent pattern. INNER HARMONY is a value much more important for Hungarians than for Americans, a result that is not self-evident. (24) The factor structure may provide an

explanation for this. In Hungary, this value, the composure and the care with oneself it represents was central for the major value system that was used by individuals hostile to the old regime. In 1990, this alternative system collapsed, together with the regime, and the oppositional connotations of the value also disappeared. INNER HARMONY, however, became even more important as a value itself, and became linked to both of the new subsystems that became more focal and also less opposed to each other by the collapse of the regime: the family-oriented and personality-oriented value systems. With the formation of these two system, INNER HARMONY also leaves the purely aesthetic fourth factor.

If we add the earlier findings about the selection of HELPFUL, all these provide an important sub pattern for analysis of the changes in the Hungarian value system in the last 15 years. The relation to oneself and the others; the care of the self, and the care for and the openness toward others received a special impact in the old regime that to a large extent defines their role up till today. The care for the others, tolerance towards everyone, without respect to individual characteristics, was a central element of the explicit ideology of the former regime; but one that was in a certain way betrayed by its practice. Its value was therefore not questioned explicitly, but was subtly undermined. This ambivalence came to surface after the systemic changes, revealing strong disturbances in the value system concerning the relations toward others; the increasing gap between the self and the other. (25) The care of the self, however, was condemned as egoism. Therefore, it became a conscious part of the silent opposition strategies, whether in the form of family, personal relations, or aestheticism. The changes eliminated the controversial aspect of this value, leading to a temporary increase in average importance, and a sustained new role in the shaping of the structure of the value system. The care of the self therefore kept a central role in the autonomous value systems even in the new regime.

6. Conclusion

The paper posed four questions about continuity, discontinuity, and reversal concerning changes in value preferences and the structure of the value system in Hungary. After a detailed description and analysis, it is now possible to give an exhaustive answer to these questions.

First of all, the results confirm the expectation that in 1978, we were just able to document the presence of the particular kind of official-socialist value system as it existed and exerted a hold over the population for decades. By 1982, the hold of this system of value already diminished. The singular most important element in this system was the overwhelming importance given to ideological values, represented in the Rokeach test by PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY. They were selected by as the most important values in Hungary in such an overwhelming way that only could be compared to countries who were actually in war. (26) This is even understandable if we conceive of communism as a prolongation of W.W.II. These were also the values that dominated the structure of the value system, defining one pole in three out of the five existing factors.

The mere claim that ideology played a large role in the old regime is certainly not a novelty that requires justification. But the results of the four surveys contain more information than just a general support or a concrete measure of a truism. First, they show the preponderance played by ideological considerations - for or against the regime - in the structure of the whole value system that is not at all self-evident. Second, the results document that the steady erosion of this ideological system already started in the 1980s, and by 1990, it has completely vanished from the value structure. Third, it also contains a finding that is novel and of crucial importance, even if the proposal has been made earlier in theoretical discussions. (27) Ideology not only played a large role in the past, but was in fact, according to our data, the cement, the glue, or rather the lubricator in that society, by providing the link between ends and means. In 1978, most of the unrotated and

rotated factors contained both terminal and instrumental values. Ends and means were connected, even if this connection was made through adherence or opposition to the ideological values. By the 1990s, it was not only the preponderant role of the ideological values that disappeared, but the links between ends and means altogether. By 1993, we had seven value factors instead of five, of which ideological values were only present in one, indicating the increasing pluralism and crystallisation of the value system of Hungary. But of the seven factors, six contained almost exclusively either only terminal, or only instrumental values; and the same separation was characteristic of the three basic unrotated factors. The only factor which preserved a mixed character was, not surprisingly, connected to the family. In a society where no connections exist between ends and means, atomisation stops only in the final instance before the complete dissolution of all supra-individual entities: at the level of the family. (28)

This separation between ends and means as the lasting effect of Communism may well be the single most important result of our study. Since 1978, the official-communist value system steadily lost its direct influence, and by the 1990s, it has completely collapsed. But it left a strong legacy in the form of a vacuum, as nothing has replaced it either during the long agony of the system, or in its short aftermath.

The continuity in the process of atomisation leads to the second question. In the 1983 report, apart from atomisation, we found that the Hungarian value system was also extremely individualised and intellectualised. While in the United States, the most important instrumental values, apart from the ethical values ranked high in all countries were the pragmatic values or the values of interpersonal relations, in Hungary, these values were equalled or preceded by those intellectual values that in the US were far left behind (INTELLECTUAL, LOGICAL, IMAGINATIVE). It was argued that it can be explained as the result of the peculiar, forced modernisation process that happened in Hungary. (29) However, another slightly different explanation can also be put forward that regards this less as an unintended consequence, and

more as the direct effect of the unfolding of the inner logic of the system itself. According to this view, the Party directly contributed to the excessive intellectualisation of the society. In contradistinction to the usually assumed opposition between the communist party and the intellectuals, this approach conceives of the communist party as a party preparing the power of intellectuals. (30)

The results lend more support to the second scenario, as they demonstrate that in the last fifteen years, in spite of the gradual loosening of the grip of the system, the process has not disappeared, and was only increased even by the systemic change. As a consequence, as of today, intellectual values have acquired almost dominance in the ranking of instrumental values, equalling to or even advancing beyond the ethical values. They also single-handedly define the most important cleavages in the structure of the value system. The process of individualisation, atomisation, and intellectualisation in this extreme form may well have been started by the Communist Party, but it gathered a momentum on its own, and continues even after the demise of its "founding father". Intellectual virtues are not means for certain ends in Hungary, but became ends in themselves concerning the value preferences of the whole population; have become "auto finalised".

So far, emphasis has been laid on continuity. However, answering the third questions, there were also important changes in the value system in the 1990s; there was discontinuity. In 1990, ideology lost importance in average rankings and in defining the basic frameworks of the structure of the value system. The whole system became more pluralistic, and acquired some new profiles. The profile of religious and personality values became more marked. The considerations about family lost their over politicised and ambivalent character. A number of values connected to the hopes of a freer world, more relaxed, richer in human experience and relations gained importance and focus, as testified both by the average selections and the factor loading (LOVE, FAMILY, INNER HARMONY, HAPPINESS, WISDOM, SELF-RESPECT; or the stronger link between WELL-BEING and AMBITIOUS). Though there were

also some less positive signs, such as the sudden importance gained by material WELL-BEING, in both average selections and in factor loading; or the huge losses of importance in values that may have been compromised in the former regime, but that could have been reconsidered on their own right (SELF-CONTROLLED, EQUALITY, SOCIAL RECOGNITION).

But the most disquieting sign concerns a certain definite retreat from the changes of 1990 by 1993; and this at once gives the answer to the fourth question posed at the beginning. First of all, ideology again gained importance, even reaching a level beyond the documented communist years, though as yet this change had no impact on the structure of the value system. Shifts in the relative importance of the two values of PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY proved to be reliable indicators in the past of a sensitivity within the population at large for increasing external threats in the form of a hardening of the official line, with the potential consequences concerning the conduct of life. (31) The huge gains between 1990 and 1993 point out this potential.

But this is not the only similar change. Though the major structure of the value system remained unchanged between 1990 and 1993, all those small signs that pointed out the hopes of 1990 were reversed. LOVE and INNER HARMONY resumed their earlier value, and there was a swing back in FAMILY and HAPPINESS as well; and many of the noted small changes within the factor structures were also reversed.

The fundamental structural characteristics of the value system in Hungary, to repeat, stayed the same in 1993 as in 1990 and different from the 1980s and especially the 1970s, reflecting the mutual links between the systemic change and changes in values, and specifying their exact modality. But much of the signs promising that 1990 may have been not only the grave of the moribund old regime, but also the starting point of a new and healthy development, with novel connections between ends and means, have disappeared, and the strong latent effects of the former system were even gaining momentum.

Notes

- (1) For a comprehensive report of the early findings, see Elemér Hankiss, Róbert Manchin, László Füstös, and Árpád Szakolczai, 'Kényszerpályán? (On a Forced Track? An Analysis of the Value System of Hungarian Society, 1930-1978). Research report, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1983.
- (2) See Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (N.Y., The Free Press, 1973); Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 1974); and Stephen Harding and David Phillips, with Michael Fogarty, *Contrasting Values in Western Europe: Unity, Diversity, and Change* (London, Macmillan, 1986); Melvin L. Cohn, *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values*, 2nd ed (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1977).
- (3) For relevant publications, see Elemér Hankiss, Róbert Manchin, László Füstös, and Árpád Szakolczai, 'Continuity and Break: the Analysis of the Value System of Hungarian Society, 1930-1978', research report, Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1982; Hankiss *et al.*, 'Interactions between socio-economic factors, ways of life, and value orientations', research report, UNESCO, 1982; E. Hankiss, *Diagnózisok I* (Diagnoses) (Budapest, Magvető, 1982), and *Diagnózisok II* (Diagnoses) (Budapest, Magvető, 1986); R. Manchin, 'Individual Economic Strategies and Social Consciousness', *Social Research* 55 (1988), 1-2: 77-95; A. Szakolczai, 'A cigányság értékrendjének sajátosságai' (The specificities of the value system of gypsies), *Szociológia*, 1982, no.4; 'On the characteristics of the value choices of students', in Ildikó Hrubos (ed.), *The Social Conditions of Engineers and Economists* (Budapest, Department of Sociology, University of Economics, 1987); Hankiss *et al.*, 'Modernization of Value Systems: Indicators of Change in Cross-cultural Comparisons', in Ilona Kovács (ed.), *Search for American Values: Contribution of Hungarian Americans to American Values* (Budapest, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, 1990).
- (4) Such a connection between objective knowledge and the proper conduct of life was central for the whole undertaking of Descartes. Thus he starts his essay on *Optics*, the first of the three essays to which his *Discourse on the Method* was written as a Preface with the following words: "The conduct of our life depends entirely on our senses, and since sight is the noblest and most comprehensive of the senses, inventions which serve to increase its power are undoubtedly among the most useful there can be." See *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.152.
- (5) Thus, a report by an American think tank on the recent political development stated the following: "The problem [in

Hungary now] is not so much the country's lack of development but its self-inflicted misdirection" (see 'US group: Magyar democracy in crisis', *Budapest Week* 3 (November 11-17, 1993), 36:3). The crucial question is not simply whether this assessment is correct or not, but the reasons that made such a serious statement possible. And these reasons evidently have to do with values and subjective considerations, not interests and other objective factors.

(6) See Rokeach, 1973, and also M. Rokeach (ed.), *Understanding Human Values: Individual and Societal* (N.Y., Free Press, 1979); and 'Inducing Change and Stability in Belief Systems and Personality Structures', *Journal of Social Issues* 41 (1985), 1:153-171.

(7) The total number of cases for the four years were 807, 2938, 1320, and 1538 respectively. Those who filled out completely the tests were 697, 2168, 1082, and 1184 in the four samples. The percentage of missing values is therefore quite high. This is inevitable for such a complex test. But the sample bias was very weak according to the major variables (education, occupation, residence, gender, age). Therefore, in our view, the small distortion in the sample is more than compensated by the richness of the results; because, as a methodological exercise done in 1992 using the child-rearing set of the EVSSG has shown, the complete ranking provides much finer results than the mere selection of the first 5, 6, or 8 most important values.

(8) Rokeach is always using the median and not the mean in order to measure average preference. This is in fact the correct way to proceed with ordinal data. However, because of the large number of cases in our data, and the implicit use of means for all multivariate methods (factor or cluster analysis), we decided to use the means. It was also supported by the fact that there was no perceivable difference between the results obtained by means or medians.

(9) Throughout the paper, the word "significant" will imply statistical significance.

(10) This was corroborated by the results of the child-rearing principles test obtained for 1982, 1990, and 1992. In all three years, "religious faith" was selected only by a few respondents (below 20 %), with no major shifts.

(11) Adding everything together, the changes reached a .10 significance level between 1978 and 1993.

(12) See Hankiss et al, 1983.

(13) Thus, while the median value for the total sample was in 1978 2.5 and 5.9 for PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, respectively, for those who also finished a party school, it was 1.9 and 3.2, while for university graduates who were not party

members, it was 4.6 and 8.0. Here, because of the smaller number of cases for the subgroups, in line with the established usage, we used median instead of mean. See Szakolczai, 1987.

(14) For easy and short introductions to factor analysis, see Jae-On Kim and Charles W. Mueller, *Introduction to Factor Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1978), and Kim and Charles W. Mueller, *Factor Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1978).

(15) Such a choice was supported by all possible criteria. First, in case of all four time periods, the scree curve flattened almost completely by the next possible factor. Second, in this way, for all years, the principal components used in the factor model had an eigenvalue above 1.30, and the actual factors all had an eigenvalue remaining above 0.60. In other words, had we used these "objective" criteria for setting limits on the factors, we would have arrived to exactly the same factor structure as on the basis of the scree curve.

(16) The exact numbers for the four years are 22.2%, 21.5%, 26.2%, and 23.6% respectively. In the later years, the variance explained is higher because there are more factors, though this is somewhat compensated by the declining eigenvalue of the first factor (this value for the four years is 3.16, 2.78, 2.59, 2.33). The reason for this decline will be apparent by the concrete analysis. The fact that the percentage of variance explained is by far the highest in 1990 seems to indicate a peculiar crystallisation of the value system in that year.

(17) About this, see Norbert Elias, *The Civilising Process* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978); and also Philippe Ariès, *L'Enfant et la vie familiale sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, Seuil, 1973); Michel Foucault, *Surveiller et punir* (Paris, Gallimard, 1975); Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph* (Princeton University Press, 1977); Gerhard Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).

(18) The first unrotated factor in the 1968 American sample was similar, but with certain characteristic differences. First, the terminal values found together with the intellectual and pragmatic values on one of the poles were not the ideological values, but WORK, WISDOM, and INNER HARMONY; and the core values of the other pole were not so much the instrumental values related to interpersonal relations (FORGIVING, LOVING), but CLEAN, POLITE, and CHEERFUL.

(19) For similar shifts, see the changes in WISDOM, INNER HARMONY, or PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY.

(20) For the data, see Szakolczai, 1987.

(21) The strong link empirically existing between these two values is reinforced by the original Hungarian child-rearing tests,

where in both 1977 and 1982, educating for honesty and the love and respect for family were always strongly correlated, and formed a separate factor.

(22) It should be mentioned that in 1982, there was still a link between ideology and family-responsibility in two factors.

(23) The importance of this value within the whole test is evident, as Rokeach even published a book by that title. See his *The Open and the Closed Mind* (N.Y., Basic Books, 1960).

(24) Its median value in the Hungarian sample in 1978 was 8.42, while in the United States in 1968 was 10.46.

(25) This was also one of the major conclusions of another article, analysis the attitudes of mayors within the concrete context of their work in Hungary and the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1992.

See A. Szakolczai, 'Types of Mayors, Types of Subjectivity: Continuity and Discontinuity in the East-Central European Transitions 1', EUI Working Papers, 1993/5, pp. 115-117.

(26) This was the case for Israel in the 1970s; see Rokeach, 1979.

(27) See Vaclav Havel, *The Power of the Powerless* (Ed. John Keane), (London, Hutchinson, 1985), pp.31-2.

(28) This can again be supported by a similar finding from the study of mayors, where it was shown that the only strong cleavage within the new local councils was not along ideological or national political lines, but along the different areas (neighborhoods) within the same locality. See A. Szakolczai, 'Re-Building the Polity: A Comparative Study of Mayors in the Hungarian, Czech and Slovakian Republics', EUI Working Papers, 1993/8, pp. 27-9.

(29) See Hankiss *et al.*, 1983.

(30) For the original theoretical statement, see George Konrád and Iván Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (N.Y., Harcourt, 1979). For an empirical studies confirming the intellectualisation of the communist party apparatus, see references to an empirical study of the party apparatus done in the late 1980s in Poland in Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991); and Agnes Horváth and Árpád Szakolczai: *The Dissolution of Communist Power: The Case of in Hungary* (London, Routledge, 1992).

(31) As a proof, let us mention the following evidence. At the turn of 1979-1980, we were administering the Rokeach survey on a subsample of about 400 individuals. Half of the questionnaires were accidentally filled out before Afghanistan, half after. The only two values with a major difference were exactly PEACE and NATIONAL SECURITY, fully explaining the difference found between their 1978 and 1982 average rankings.

Appendix

Table 1. The Rokeach test

A. Terminal values

1. A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
* (In Hungary: MATERIAL WELL-BEING)
2. A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)
3. HAPPINESS (contentedness)
4. WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
5. FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of the loved ones)
6. INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
7. EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
8. A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
* (In Hungary: THE JOY OF WELL-DONE WORK)
9. AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
10. NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
12. MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
13. PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14. SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
15. FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
16. A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the art)
17. SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
18. SALVATION (saved, eternal life)

B. Instrumental values

19. IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative)
20. COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs)
21. BROADMINDED (open-minded)
22. OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful)
23. INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflexive)
24. SELF-CONTROLLED (restrained, self-disciplined)
* (In Hungary: DISCIPLINED)
25. RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)
26. CAPABLE (competent, effective)
27. CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful)
28. LOGICAL (consistent, rational)
29. FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)
30. INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
31. HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)
32. HONEST (sincere, truthful)
33. LOVING (affectionate, tender)
34. CLEAN (neat, tidy)
35. AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)
36. POLITE (courteous, well-mannered)

Table 2. The average ranking for each value

	1978	1982	1990	1993	ANOVA	t-tests
1. WELL-BEING	8.2	8.7	6.8	6.5	.001	<u>a</u> ? b c e f
2. PEACE	4.4	3.9	4.9	3.7	.001	a b c <u>d</u> ? f
3. HAPPINESS	6.9	7.6	6.0	6.2	.001	a b d e f
4. WISDOM	13.1	12.7	12.2	11.3	.001	<u>a</u> ? b c d e f
5. FAMILY SEC.	5.2	5.3	3.9	4.6	.001	b c d e f
6. INNER HARMONY	8.9	8.7	7.5	8.4	.001	b c d <u>f</u> ?
7. EQUALITY	9.4	9.1	11.2	10.7	.001	b c d e f
8. WORK	7.7	8.2	8.7	9.8	.001	a b c d e f
9. EXCITING LIFE	11.7	11.9	11.7	11.9	n.s.	
10. NATIONAL SEC.	7.4	6.8	8.1	6.6	.001	<u>a</u> b c d f
11. TRUE FRIENDSHIP	9.4	8.9	9.2	9.1	.05	<u>a</u>
12. MATURE LOVE	10.3	10.7	9.7	10.6	.001	<u>a</u> ? b c <u>d</u>
13. PLEASURE	11.8	11.9	11.6	12.0	n.s.	<u>c</u> ?
14. SELF-RESPECT	9.6	9.6	9.9	10.5	.001	<u>b</u> ? c e f
15. FREEDOM	8.7	8.8	9.1	9.0	n.s.	
16. BEAUTY	13.9	13.6	14.2	14.0	.001	b <u>d</u> ? e
17. SOCIAL RECOGN.	8.8	9.2	11.1	10.5	.001	<u>a</u> ? b c d e f
18. SALVATION	15.8	15.5	15.4	15.7	n.s.	<u>d</u> ?
19. IMAGINATIVE	10.9	10.9	10.7	10.1	.001	<u>c</u> e f
20. COURAGEOUS	7.2	7.4	7.3	7.4	n.s.	
21. BROADMINDED	10.4	9.9	10.7	10.4	.001	<u>a</u> ? b <u>e</u>
22. OBEDIENT	10.9	10.5	11.1	11.6	.001	b <u>c</u> ? e f
23. INTELLECTUAL	8.3	7.6	7.4	6.4	.001	a c d e f
24. SELF-CONTROLLED	9.2	8.2	9.1	9.0	.001	a b e
25. RESPONSIBLE	6.9	7.3	7.2	7.2	n.s.	<u>a</u> ?
26. CAPABLE	11.4	11.6	11.4	11.2	n.s.	<u>e</u> ?
27. CHEERFUL	9.9	10.3	9.8	10.2	n.s.	<u>b</u> ? <u>c</u> ?
28. LOGICAL	10.9	10.3	10.2	9.3	.001	a c <u>d</u> e f
29. FORGIVING	11.0	11.2	11.2	11.4	n.s.	
30. INDEPENDENT	9.1	10.1	9.7	10.0	.001	a <u>b</u> ? <u>d</u> f
31. HELPFUL	7.9	8.7	9.0	9.2	.001	a d <u>e</u> f
32. HONEST	6.7	6.4	6.5	6.7	n.s.	
33. LOVING	10.2	11.0	10.0	10.2	.001	a b e
34. CLEAN	10.0	9.2	9.4	9.7	.001	a <u>d</u> ? e
35. AMBITIOUS	9.5	10.8	10.5	10.8	.001	a d f
36. POLITE	10.8	9.8	9.7	10.4	.001	a c d e

- ANOVA is a variance test for all years taken together;
- the small letters for t-tests indicate significant changes between single years in the following way: a: 1978-82, b: 1982-90, c: 1990-93, d: 1978-90, e: 1982-93, f: 1978-93; ? mark: .05 level; underlining: .01 level; simple letter: .001 level.

Table 3. The first unrotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
IMAGINATIVE	.53	.53	.59	.49
LOGICAL	.41	.50	.55	.50
CAPABLE	.29	.42	.49	.41
INTELLECTUAL	.28	.26	.37	.29
BROADMINDED	.30	.41	.17	.25
INDEPENDENT	.36	.17	.23	.23
COURAGEOUS	.29	.22	.17	.13
RESPONSIBLE	.33	.31	.15	.30
FREEDOM	.39	.20	.08	.17
EQUALITY	.20	.20	-.15	.05
NATIONAL SEC	.38	.25	-.14	.17
PEACE	.34	.21	-.20	.10
SOCIAL RECOGN	.23	.12	.01	.17
WELL-BEING	-.28	-.21	.08	-.05
PLEASURE	-.37	-.24	.07	-.15
HAPPINESS	-.32	-.28	-.05	-.19
CHEERFUL	-.36	-.38	-.16	-.29
SALVATION	-.25	-.20	-.36	-.26
HELPFUL	-.17	-.15	-.37	-.29
OBEDIENT	-.41	-.38	-.40	-.29
CLEAN	-.44	-.43	-.36	-.42
POLITE	-.43	-.44	-.38	-.48
LOVING	-.47	-.46	-.43	-.45
FORGIVING	-.48	-.48	-.51	-.46

Table 4. The second unrotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
NATIONAL SEC	.55	.48	.53	.52
PEACE	.50	.46	.45	.42
FREEDOM	.30	.28	.29	.34
EQUALITY	.30	.34	.28	.38
SOCIAL RECOGN	.17	.29	.24	.24
SELF-CONTROLLED	.23	.10	.20	.16
POLITE	.35	.12	- .21	.04
CLEAN	.35	.00	- .18	- .05
OBEDIENT	.33	.29	- .09	.21
CAPABLE	- .28	- .09	.13	- .12
LOGICAL	- .28	- .23	.03	- .12
IMAGINATIVE	- .33	- .17	.06	- .26
FRIENDSHIP	- .20	- .16	- .24	- .25
LOVE	- .25	- .43	- .36	- .46
HAPPINESS	- .10	- .25	- .42	- .24
CHEERFUL	- .19	- .17	- .43	- .19
PLEASURE	- .28	- .29	- .54	- .35
EXCITING LIFE	- .32	- .30	- .45	- .39

Table 5. The third unrotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
BEAUTY	.39	.34	.30	.27
WISDOM	.24	.20	.20	.39
SALVATION	.15	.32	.19	.32
INNER HARMONY	.12	- .05	.33	.31
SELF-RESPECT	.11	.19	.33	.18
BROADMINDED	.24	- .02	.13	.23
FORGIVING	.21	.12	.18	.17
FAMILY	- .22	- .41	.20	- .05
HAPPINESS	- .20	- .32	- .09	- .03
AMBITIOUS	- .34	.03	- .15	- .23
PLEASURE	- .21	.05	- .23	- .36
WELL-BEING	- .54	- .28	- .40	- .46

Table 6. The first rotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
IMAGINATIVE	.59	.55	.49	.39
LOGICAL	.48	.51	.61	.47
CAPABLE	.40	.44	.35	.37
INTELLECTUAL	.34	.27	.42	.37
BROADMINDED	.24	.32	-.01	.06
INDEPENDENT	.44	.23	.23	.31
COURAGEOUS	.19	.24	.12	.03
RESPONSIBLE	.24	.17	.06	.14
SALVATION	-.31	-.29	-.38	-.31
HELPFUL	-.15	-.26	-.35	-.42
OBEDIENT	-.52	-.39	-.50	-.38
CLEAN	-.52	-.37	-.14	-.03
POLITE	-.54	-.40	-.18	-.26
LOVING	-.33	-.43	-.35	-.36
FORGIVING	-.49	-.51	-.53	-.53

Table 7. The second rotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
FREEDOM	.49	.45	.34	.36
EQUALITY	.43	.37	.28	.32
NATIONAL SEC	.43	.52	.71	.63
PEACE	.30	.50	.64	.57
SOCIAL RECOGN	.32	.17	.04	.08
SELF-CONTROLLED	.22	.03	.06	.12
FAMILY	-.43	-.29	-.06	-.07
HAPPINESS	-.33	-.38	-.26	-.19
INNER HARMONY	-.28	-.20	-.12	-.22
LOVE	-.28	-.28	-.26	-.28
LOVING	-.36	-.13	-.13	-.09
WELL-BEING	-.28	-.15	-.16	-.08
FRIENDSHIP	-.14	-.11	-.21	-.26
CHEERFUL	-.20	-.12	-.23	-.17
PLEASURE	-.16	-.23	-.40	-.29
EXCITING LIFE	-.06	-.12	-.43	-.34

Table 8. The third rotated factor, version A

	1978	1982	1990	1993
PEACE	.46	.29		
NATIONAL SEC	.44	.25		
RESPONSIBILITY	.32	.35		
HONEST	.25	.01		
FAMILY	.33	.29		
CHEERFUL	-.39	-.35		
PLEASURE	-.47	-.36		
EXCITING LIFE	-.44	-.31		

Table 9. The third rotated factor, version B

	1978	1982	1990	1993
IMAGINATIVE			.32	.39
BROADMINDED			.38	.36
LOGICAL			.10	.21
CAPABLE			.36	.20
RESPONSIBLE			.32	.24
LOVING			-.30	-.18
CHEERFUL			-.43	-.24
CLEAN			-.49	-.64
POLITE			-.49	-.48

Table 10. The fourth rotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
WELL-BEING	.56	.45	.34	.62
HAPPINESS	.23	.07	.08	.26
PLEASURE	.32	.26	.00	.20
AMBITIOUS	.39	.31	.43	.15
OBEDIENT	.17	.34	.06	.23
WISDOM	-.24	-.17	-.01	-.07
LOVE	-.12	-.19	-.24	-.20
FRIENDSHIP	-.17	-.13	-.32	-.08
INNER HARMONY	-.19	-.26	-.12	-.18
BROADMINDED	-.33	-.28	-.34	-.12
BEAUTY	-.34	-.28	-.29	-.32

Table 11. The fifth rotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
SOCIAL RECOGN	.28	.53	.41	.45
WORK	.36	.30	.37	.30
SELF-RESPECT	.33	.24	.42	.19
PEACE	- .46	- .17		
NATIONAL SEC	- .30	- .05		
CLEAN	- .24	.00		
CHEERFUL	- .23	- .17		
LOVING		- .09	- .17	- .29
LOVE		- .20	- .23	- .43
WELL-BEING		- .28	- .44	.03
PLEASURE		- .12	- .35	- .14
HAPPINESS		- .38	- .43	- .35

Table 12. The sixth rotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
WISDOM		.37	.50	.49
SALVATION		.41	.40	.32
BEAUTY		.20	.15	.16
FORGIVING		.25	.19	.10
OBEDIENT		.20	- .04	.05
INNER HARMONY		- .03	.16	.28
PEACE		- .17	.00	.00
NATIONAL SEC		- .16	- .01	- .01
CLEAN		- .23		
HONEST		- .22		
FAMILY		- .34		
SOCIAL RECOGNITION			- .32	- .17
PLEASURE			- .24	- .34
FREEDOM			- .07	- .31

Table 13. The seventh rotated factor

	1978	1982	1990	1993
FAMILY			.51	.42
RESPONSIBLE			.28	.32
HONEST			.15	.32
INNER HARMONY			.38	.29
PLEASURE			- .21	- .27
FREEDOM			- .16	- .13
IMAGINATIVE			- .19	- .19


The Rokeach Value Test

Hungary, 1978, 1982, 1990, 1993.

- 44 -

Figure 1. The average ranking of terminal values

The lower the rank, the more important the value.




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Figure 2. The average ranking of instrumental values





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